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Abstract
Background: The organ donor shortfall in the UK has prompted calls to introduce legislation to
allow for presumed consent: if there is no explicit objection to donation of an organ, consent
should be presumed. The current debate has not taken in account accepted meanings of
presumption in law and science and the consequences for rights of ownership that would arise
should presumed consent become law. In addition, arguments revolve around the rights of the
competent autonomous adult but do not always consider the more serious implications for
children or the disabled.
Discussion: Any action or decision made on a presumption is accepted in law and science as one
based on judgement of a provisional situation. It should therefore allow the possibility of reversing
the action or decision. Presumed consent to organ donation will not permit such reversal. Placing
prime importance on the functionality of body organs and their capacity to sustain life rather than
on explicit consent of the individual will lead to further debate about rights of ownership and
potentially to questions about financial incentives and to whom benefits should accrue. Factors that
influence donor rates are not fully understood and attitudes of the public to presumed consent
require further investigation. Presuming consent will also necessitate considering how such a
measure would be applied in situations involving children and mentally incompetent adults.
Summary: The presumption of consent to organ donation cannot be understood in the same way
as is presumption when applied to science or law. Consideration should be given to the
consequences of presuming consent and to the questions of ownership and organ monetary value
as these questions are likely to arise should presumed consent be permitted. In addition, the
implications of presumed consent on children and adults who are unable to object to organ
donation, requires serious contemplation if these most vulnerable members of society are to be
protected.
Background
The controversy about presumed consent has been
recently revived in the UK as a consequence of the organ
donor shortfall [1,2]. The debate is far from settled and
only altering the law to permit the presumption of con-
sent with respect to donor organs will provide the answer
to whether this will indeed remedy the problem of organ
shortage. It will not, however, answer the questions about
what exactly is being presumed; the ethical and legal
implications that could follow will need to be considered
carefully. The meaning of presumption, the issues that
could be raised about the ownership of and rights over
body organs and further implications for gain, are dis-
cussed. Applications of presumed consent in different
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tion of factors that influence donation and of attitudes
towards presumed consent, is acknowledged. This article
also addresses the issue of protection of the most vulnera-
ble members of society who may be unable to dissent.
Discussion
The meaning of 'presumed consent'
The understanding of presumption of consent to organ
donation may be considered, by some practitioners of law
or science, to be an inaccurate and misleading term. This
stems from the general understanding of 'presumption' in
law and science: as an inference that is made on available
fact or evidence with the understanding that vital infor-
mation that can render the inference invalid may be miss-
ing. In law a presumption holds – that of innocence, for
example – until a substantial body of evidence is pro-
duced to the contrary. Just like a scientific theory or
hypothesis, a legal presumption is maintained for as long
as no evidence is provided to disprove it or no valid objec-
tion is raised against it. A presumption, in law and science,
is therefore a 'provisional estimate of facts' [3] based on
some accepted fundamental state or pattern of behaviour.
Unlike the presumptions in law or the hypotheses of sci-
ence, presumption of consent for the use of body organs
cannot afford any possibility of abandoning the presump-
tion, reversing the decision or of retracting any action
based on the decision (clearly, the deceased donor cannot
raise objections). The presumption of consent for organ
donation cannot therefore be taken as a presumption of
donor willingness, with the specific understanding that
there will be a provision for changing the course of action
should further evidence emerge, but rather as a presump-
tion of state rights to post-mortem body organs, unless an
objection by the 'occupant' of the body is raised whilst the
'occupant' is still in 'residence'. Opponents of presumed
consent argue that the absence of donor willingness is
morally unacceptable because it can be seen as a violation
of their wishes [4]. (It has even been suggested that the
term presumed consent be replaced by 'specified refusal'
to put the emphasis on the action taken rather than on
assumption [5]).
It is clear that presumed consent is advocated as a means
of meeting organ donor shortages and not because the
state wishes to assume ownership of body parts per se.
Nevertheless, it places the greater emphasis on functional-
ity of body organs and how they can be best utilised to
sustain life rather than on the importance of requiring
permission of the individual to donate his or her organs.
It also takes away the power to 'gift' that donorship con-
fers [6].
If functionality of body organs becomes of prevailing
importance, it could be argued that the body is predomi-
nantly a vessel equipped with all the necessary instrumen-
tation for maintaining life and that is occupied and used
by the person to whom the body belongs. Consequently,
if presumed consent is advocated, it could be reasoned
that since after death the 'occupant' no longer needs the
'vessel', if any of the instrumentation is still functional it
should be used to better or save the life of another. The
acceptance of this premise and hence of the liberty of the
state to assume the rights to decide about further usage
(pending no objections) raises further issues about the
right of ownership and hence who should benefit from
body organs, and how presumed consent will extend to
competent minors and mentally incompetent adults.
The right to sell body parts
The debate about presumed consent and importance of
optimising the functionality of body organs can extend to
ownership and the right to sell these organs [7-9]. It has
even been argued, in accordance with a rights-based the-
ory of justice, that body organs are akin to goods to which
a person can claim rights [10]; the prospect of treating
body organs, in future, as 'property' has been raised in a
common law case [11]. Whilst alive, the 'occupant' has an
acknowledged right of ownership as evidenced in medical
and other research practice: autonomy of mentally com-
petent adults is respected and consent to medical treat-
ment and/or study on any part of the body must always be
sought. It could be argued that consent is required for
research and medical treatment because there may be risks
involved and that these risks no longer apply post-mor-
tem, but this does not take into account all the underlying
reasons for consent. One of these is the fundamental
respect for the right of the individual to make decisions
about his or her own body and in certain situations to
accept payment for its usage as is evidenced when remu-
neration is offered for participation in research. It is not a
quantum leap to suggest that if functionality of body
organs is so valued and remuneration for research on the
living body permitted, the worth of body organs (just like
land and other acquired assets), should be allowed, after
death, to pass to relatives or any other beneficiaries nom-
inated by the deceased in a will. Indeed, this may be con-
sidered a natural extension of current practice: that next of
kin take care of the deceased body [12]. If the state wishes
to presume consent to organ donation (in the absence of
any objections) and to treat these as transferable
resources, the question of why individuals should not be
permitted to organise for the sale of their body organs
post-mortem, for the financial benefit of family and loved
ones, could very well be raised. The sale of body organs is
highly contentious but paradoxically, such a debate may
raise awareness of the need for organs and the suggestion
of a financial incentive could even encourage organ dona-Page 2 of 5
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gestion of establishing a market in body organs needs to
be seen as a means of increasing supply for the benefit of
those who are in need and therefore has sound moral
grounding [9]. It should be considered alongside other
measures and be properly controlled and implemented to
avoid exploitation [9]. These arguments in support of the
sale of body parts, are made with the assumption that
what is considered to be 'morally permissible' does not
take into account any objections based on religious beliefs
[8]. Religious and cultural views need to be given just con-
sideration because certain beliefs and traditions oppose
the sale of body organs and indeed the notion of pre-
sumed consent [13]. Conversely, for others such measures
are acceptable; surgeons from India have protested against
the objections to body organ trade [14].
Presumed consent in the case of children
The age at which autonomy is granted varies in the UK
depending on whether it is with regard to consent to med-
ical treatment or consent to participation in research. In
the former case, children are given the status of autono-
mous adults at the age of sixteen; in the latter the age of
consent is eighteen. This distinction has not been properly
qualified in the UK and can lead to bizarre situations [15].
Before presumed consent can be permitted, there would
need to be a decision made about the age at which auton-
omy of an individual to object to organ donation is
respected. Once such an age is decided, it will inevitably
lead, in the UK, to the question of Gillick competency.
This term arose from English case law and is applied in
relation to consent to medical treatment where there is a
question about the rights of a minor to make autonomous
decisions about such matters [16]. A Gillick competent
child is one who, although chronologically below the
determined age of consenting to medical treatment, is
deemed to be intelligent and mature enough to under-
stand the consequences of such a treatment and therefore
is considered as able to be treated as an autonomous adult
[16]. Whilst the notion of Gillick competency arose from
the law, the decision about whether or not to treat a child
as Gillick competent (and hence as an autonomous adult)
is left to the medical practitioner. The decision about
whether or not to allow a minor the autonomous status of
an adult with regard to medical treatment is fraught with
difficulty and uncertainties. It would become even more
complicated if it were applied to presuming consent to
organ donation, for the differences between appreciating
the consequences of medical treatment, and hence being
able to consent to it, and being sufficiently competent to
understand what refusal of organ donation may mean, are
vast. The former requires the young person to have an
understanding of what the treatment will mean to him or
her. The latter requires a much more evolved perspective
on fundamental issues of life and death and the ability to
make a balanced judgment and decision without being
pressured by feelings of guilt that refusal will deprive
another human being of life. It may be considered safer to
reject the notion of Gillick competency for presumed con-
sent altogether and leave the right of refusal for minors in
all cases up to parents, guardians and carers. This does not
simplify matters. Reliance solely on the decision of par-
ents or guardians, could mean ignoring the wishes of a
fourteen year old mother, who is estranged from her own
parents and who on her death bed insists that she does
not want any of her organs donated. (It is recognised that
this situation can only occur where organ recovery is to be
made without brain stem death). If Gillick competency to
presumed consent cannot be invoked, it would permit
taking organs from a minor in cases where no autono-
mous adult authorised to object to such a measure were
available.
Presumed consent in the case of mentally incompetent 
adults
Decisions on behalf of the mentally incompetent need to
be made in cases of medical treatment and in such situa-
tions, common law in the UK sets the principle that such
decisions should always be made in the best interests of
the patient [17]. There have been instances in which it has
been difficult to ascertain exactly what these best interests
are. In one of the more controversial legal cases [18], the
decision was made that it would be in best interests of Y,
a physically and mentally handicapped woman, to trans-
plant her bone marrow in order to save the life of her
(mentally competent) sister even though the procedure
was not without risk and provided no benefit to Y. The
justification given for why this was in Y's best interests was
that the sister had a young child who, without its mother,
would be left in the care of its grandmother (Y's mother)
who would then not be available to see Y as often as she
did. Notwithstanding whether or not this explanation jus-
tified the best interests argument, it emphasizes the vul-
nerability of the mentally incompetent to the decisions
that can be made whilst they are alive. The situation is
even more uncertain after death. The 'best interests' argu-
ment that is used in the case of a living donor cannot be
applied post-mortem. A mentally incompetent adult will
be unable to raise objections to organ donation because,
like a child, the mentally incompetent adult is deemed to
be unable to understand the concept. However, unlike the
child with parents who are able to make a decision about
refusing donation, the mentally incompetent adult may
have no living relatives able or permitted to make such a
refusal on his/her behalf. The vulnerability of these indi-
viduals highlights one of the most potentially dangerous
aspects of presumed consent. If presumption of consent is
permitted, provision would need to be made to protect
such individuals in order to avoid inadvertently exploiting
the mentally incompetent as reservoirs of body organs.Page 3 of 5
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Introduction of presumed consent into law can take a
number of forms, and variations in the application of pre-
sumed consent [19] have been broadly classed as 'strong'
('hard') or 'soft' [7,19] depending essentially on whether
or not permission of relatives is required. However, the
distinction between the options is blurred. Even in coun-
tries in which presumption of consent does not officially
require the permission of relatives, this is sought and
taken into account [11,19]. There is no conclusive evi-
dence showing which option is the more successful in
obtaining donor organs [2]. In France and Spain, where
consent of relatives is routinely sought, the donor rates, in
2005, were 22.2 and 35.1 per million population, respec-
tively; in Austria where consent of relatives is not rou-
tinely sought, the figure was 24.8 per million population
[2]. It is worth noting that in Spain, organs are taken from
heart-beating and non heart-beating donors and this has
been credited with increasing donation rates [2]. With
limitations, in the UK, on organ availability from donors
who have suffered brain stem death (heart-beating
donors), measures to increase the number of organs
retrieved from non heart-beating donors are being advo-
cated [20,21].
According to one mathematical model, organ availability
is likely to be higher when presumed consent measures
are introduced, even when other confounding factors are
taken into account, but ambiguities in the model are
acknowledged [19]. Results of a study on twenty-two
countries show that whilst the highest rates of donation
are found in countries like Spain, Austria, Latvia, Portugal
and Belgium where presumed consent operates, there is a
greater rate of donation (per million population) from
Ireland (where informed consent is required) than from
France, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Italy
where presumed consent applies [19]. The factors that
influence donation have not been fully identified. It is
notable that, with some exceptions, the Catholic countries
of Europe, where the legal system is based on Roman law,
presume consent [19,22,23] and stress the importance of
'for the greater good' [23]. In Protestant countries, indi-
vidual rights are considered foremost and informed con-
sent is more likely to be required [23].
A recent study [7] that investigated attitudes to presumed
consent in Scotland found that, overall, a 'soft' option was
favoured although, when it came to opinions from mem-
bers of donor families, the views were not consistent.
Other responses, suggest that a deeper probing of atti-
tudes to presumed consent is needed. For example, while
payment for organs was considered, by 70% of respond-
ents, to be a measure that would encourage others to
donate, only 21% agreed that a financial incentive should
be used [7].
Ultimately, whether consent is express or presumed, the
donor and/or relatives should be fully informed before
any consent is obtained. Special attention needs to be
given to those for whom others make decisions concern-
ing their health and welfare. The easiest option would be
to apply presumed consent only to specified groups (e.g.
autonomous adults) and to disallow any vulnerable indi-
viduals from being considered as members of these
groups. This would ensure that no situation of abuse of
the vulnerable, whether intentional or unintentional,
occurs. There is no certainty, however, that such a measure
would not invoke cries of discrimination from those who
may misinterpret the measure as an indication that the
body organs of such individuals are of lesser value. It may
also create difficulties and lead to complicated legal argu-
ments with cases brought before the courts should a fam-
ily situation arise that is similar to that of the case of Y
[18], but with a deceased individual, who had been
deemed unable to make their own decisions whilst alive,
and whose organs could save the life of a relative.
The issues for vulnerable individuals require further anal-
ysis and, prior to the introduction of any legislation that
allows for presumed consent, there needs to be a thor-
ough re-examination of current laws that treat children
and mentally incompetent adults as non-autonomous.
With regard to children, reviews of the age of consent and
the notion of Gillick competency with better guidelines
for practitioners are needed. When deciding on mental
impairment or incapacity, there should be an assessment
of its scope, its nature, its duration and its durability
(drugs, medications and alcohol can all have temporary
effects that could render a person medically incompetent
to make decisions but these effects may not be lasting).
Conclusion
To presume consent may or may not alleviate the shortage
of donor organs but it will most certainly raise a number
of related ethical and legal complexities that will need to
be addressed in order to safeguard against unacceptable
practices. Fundamentally, what is meant by presumption
and how this is applied to the concept of presumed con-
sent to organ donation will have to be determined. It will
need to extend beyond the boundaries of current legal and
scientific notions and will involve legal and ethical argu-
ments about the sale of body organs, rights of ownership,
donation and bequeathing to beneficiaries. More investi-
gation of attitudes towards presumed consent and why
and how these may vary is required. Consideration must
be given to objections on religious or cultural grounds
and whether and how prospective legislation could
impinge on beliefs and practices. As always, protection of
the most vulnerable, unable to make autonomous deci-
sions, is of paramount importance in any actions taken.
Current laws and practices relating to consent and deci-Page 4 of 5
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sion-making capacities of children and vulnerable adults
need to be reviewed before introducing legislation that
permits the presumption of consent.
Summary
Consent for body organs cannot be presumed in the same
way that presumption is used in law or science. Presuming
consent for organ donation places the value of body organ
function above the requirement for permission from the
donor and raises a number of related ethical and legal
questions about ownership and sale of body organs, rights
of refusal for children and mentally incompetent adults.
The factors that influence donation rates and attitudes to
presumed consent have not been clearly identified and
require further investigation. Measures for the protection
of the most vulnerable need to be addressed before legis-
lation to allow for presumed consent can be permitted.
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